Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
Province of British Columbia
Order No. 205-1997
December 18, 1997
INQUIRY RE: An applicant's request for access to audiotapes of his own
appeal to the Public Service Appeal Board
Fourth Floor
1675 Douglas Street
Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4
Telephone: 250-387-5629
Facsimile: 250-387-1696
Web Site: http://www.oipc.bc.ca
1. Description of the review
As Information and Privacy Commissioner, I conducted a written inquiry at the
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the Office) on September
10, 1997 under section 56 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act (the Act). This inquiry arose out of a request for review of
the response by the Public Service Appeal Board (the Board) to the applicant's
request for access to audiotapes which recorded his May 6, 1997 appeal to the
Board.
2. Documentation of the inquiry process
The applicant wrote to the Board on May 22, 1997 to ask for access to "notes
taken by staff and members...records created and/or received with respect to
the Hearing held on May 6, 1997...this request includes the audiotapes taken by
you on May 6, 1997." The Board replied on June 5, 1997 by disclosing some
records, denying access to other records, and denying access to the audiotapes.
During mediation, the applicant accepted the decision to withhold some paper
records.
3. Issue under review and the burden of proof
The issue under review is the application of the Act to audio
recordings of a Board hearing. The sections of the Act referred to by the
applicant and/or the Board are as follows:
Purposes of this Act
2(1) The purposes of this Act are to make public bodies more accountable to the
public and to protect personal privacy by
(b) giving individuals a right of access to, and a right to request correction
of, personal information about themselves,
(c) specifying limited exceptions to the rights of access,
(d) preventing the unauthorized collection, use or disclosure of personal
information by public bodies, and
(e) providing for an independent review of decisions made under this Act.
(2) This Act does not replace other procedures for access to information or
limit in any way access to information that is not personal information and is
available to the public.
Information rights
4(1) A person who makes a request under section 5 has a right of access to any
record in the custody or under the control of a public body, including a record
containing personal information about the applicant.
(2) The right of access to a record does not extend to information excepted
from disclosure under Division 2 of this Part, but if that information can
reasonably be severed from a record an applicant has the right of access to the
remainder of the record.
....
Duty to assist applicants
6(1) The head of a public body must make every reasonable effort to assist
applicants and to respond without delay to each applicant openly, accurately
and completely.
(2) Moreover, the head of a public body must create a record for an applicant
if
(b) creating the record would not unreasonably interfere with the operations of
the public body.
Disclosure harmful to personal privacy
22(1) The head of a public body must refuse to disclose personal information to
an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third
party's personal privacy.
...
(3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable
invasion of a third party's personal privacy if
(4) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a
third party's personal privacy if
Section 57 of the Act, which establishes the burden of proof on parties in an
inquiry, is silent with respect to a request for review about the duty to
assist under section 6 of the Act. I decided in Order No. 110-1996, June 5,
1996, that the burden of proof to demonstrate a discharge of its duty to assist
applicants under section 6 of the Act is on the public body. Where section 22
is relied on to refuse disclosure of all or part of a record, the onus is on
the applicant to prove that disclosure would not be an unreasonable invasion of
the personal privacy of a third party.
4. The records in dispute
The records in dispute are three ninety-minute audio cassettes described by
the Board as containing approximately 3.75 recorded hours of proceedings before
it.
5. The applicant's case
The applicant and his counsel participated fully in a hearing of his
own appeal before the Public Service Appeal Board on May 6, 1997. It concerned
three competitions for positions in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food under the Public Service Act. The applicant states that staff of
the Board personally tape recorded all oral evidence and submissions at the
hearing after obtaining consent from all of the parties involved. According to
the applicant:
The mandate of the Board is to determine if the merit principle as required
under the Public Service Act has been applied by reviewing the selection
process. Given this specific framework for the Hearing, it is not unreasonable
to suggest at least 90+% of the content of the audiotapes relates to
presentations on the recruitment process by the parties involved. (Submission
of the Applicant, p. 1)
The applicant argues that he should be granted access to the audiotapes
on the basis of sections 2 and 6 of the Act, which set out requirements to
grant access to records, to sever what should not be released, and to make
every reasonable effort to help an applicant. (Submission of the Applicant,
pp. 2-4) The applicant relies in particular on Ontario Order P-820, December
20, 1994, which granted an applicant access to approximately five hours of tape
recordings, which contained the personal information of that applicant.
I have discussed further below the applicant's submissions on various
sections of the Act.
6. The Public Service Appeal Board's case
The Board is a specialized appellate tribunal established under the Public
Service Act. Its staff consist of three permanent full-time employees, all
of whom perform a support role. (Submission of the Board, paragraphs 6, 8)
Board members generally sit alone. Normally, no other Board staff are present;
the Registrar was present in the current matter. The Board submits that even
"if other Board personnel are present at an appeal, they do not transcribe a
record of the proceedings or create notes of the proceedings. There is no
court reporter or stenographer present at appeals and no official audio
recording is created." (Submission of the Board, paragraphs 8, 9)
Because Board members usually hear appeals without any administrative back-up,
it has followed the practice of tape recording appeals, using a store-bought
audio cassette tape recorder. Typically, the tape recorder is operated by the
Board member, and the tape is for Board uses only: "Appeals are taped by Board
members themselves as an informal backup, to assist them - if necessary - in
interpreting their own notes of the proceedings or to refresh their memory of
an appeal. Appeal tapes are no more than an aide memoire for the
personal use of board members. They are a personal record if not a `note.'"
(Submission of the Board, p. 13) The applicant submits that in his proceeding
the Registrar of the Board was the "only person involved in setting up
the audio recording equipment and changing tapes." (Reply Submission of the
Applicant, p. 3)
I have discussed below the Board's detailed submissions on the application of
various sections of the Act to the records in dispute.
7. Discussion
Scope of this Act
3(1) This Act applies to all records in the custody or under the control
of a public body, including court administration records, but does not apply to
the following.
The Board refers to this section for the following purpose:
Although a personal appeal tape does not qualify as a `personal note' within
the meaning of s. 3(1)(b), it is relevant that, but for use of the word `note'
in the section, these personal records of Board members would be excluded from
the Act. This is a relevant consideration in determining whether or not, on
the facts at hand, it is reasonably possible to sever these tapes within the
meaning of section 4(2) of the Act. (Submission of the Board, paragraph 14)
In my view, the applicant is on solid ground when he states in his reply
submission:
The audiotapes are records as defined under the Act and must [be] subject to
the same rules of public scrutiny as any other records of a public body.
The applicant further argues that the audiotapes contain records of a public
process. "They do not contain personal notes, advise [sic], decision or
personal view of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature." (Reply Submission of
the Applicant, p. 5) I agree with the applicant that the audiotapes are
records under the Act. I also agree with him that section 3(1)(b) of the Act
does not apply to these records.
Section 22: Disclosure harmful to personal privacy
The applicant emphasizes that the hearing in question focused on selection
procedures and criteria:
As such, the contents of the audiotapes at issue contain information primarily
related to government's selection processes - a case involving specifically
administrative procedure, not comparing candidates'
qualifications. They may contain a minute amount of third-party personal
information, depending on the interpretation of the `third party personal
information.' (Submission of the Applicant, p. 6)
In the applicant's opinion, none of the information in the tapes can be
withheld on the basis of any part of section 22(3). In his view, the only
third-party information revealed at the hearing was the names of the successful
candidates, which he describes as being "public information" when the Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food announces the appointments. (Submission of
the Applicant, p. 6)
The Board relies on section 22(3) of the Act and says that the third party
information on the tapes requires severing: "The tapes in question record
personal information of third parties, including information regarding their
employment histories, educational histories, employment experience,
qualifications and suitability for the public service position in issue."
(Submission of the Board, paragraph 17) The Board also argues that "oral
disclosure of this personal information during the applicant's May 6 appeal
does not mean the personal information has been disclosed, or that the
applicant's request for access to information should result in disclosure of
that third party personal information." (Submission of the Board, paragraph
18)
To buttress its reliance on section 22(3) of the Act to prevent disclosure of
this personal information, the Board also depends on section 9 of the Public
Service Appeal Regulation, B.C. Reg. 133/94, which provides that a party to
an appeal, including the applicant in this case, "must keep in confidence all
information about any applicant or competition that he or she obtains during an
appeal." (Submission of the Board, paragraph 19) The Board relies on this
regulation to reinforce its reliance on section 22(3) and to make the reverse
argument as well. The Regulation "does not, by contrast, favour disclosure of
that unsevered personal information to the applicant. The Board's
responsibility under the Act to guard against unreasonable invasions of
personal privacy is not attenuated by an independent confidentiality obligation
resting on the applicant under these regulations." (Submission of the Board,
paragraph 19)
In any event, I conclude, based on my review of the tapes, that section 22(3)
does not apply to the third-party personal information. None of the other job
candidates are identified. There is some personal information concerning the
applicant which he is entitled to receive: see section 22(4)(a) of the Act.
Finally, there is a small amount of personal information about other employees
of the Ministry and the Board, but it concerns their job, duties, or functions,
not their employment, occupational, or educational history. Section 22(4)(e)
of the Act expressly provides that disclosure of this type of information "is
not an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy." For all of
these reasons, I have concluded that the Board is not required to refuse to
disclose the audiotapes under section 22 of the Act.
Section 28: Accuracy of personal information
Section 29: Right to request correction of personal information
The applicant also relies on section 28 and 29 of the Act in support of his
position. Section 28 deals with the accuracy of personal information:
28. If an individual's personal information will be used by a public body to
make a decision that directly affects the individual, the public body must make
every reasonable effort to ensure that the information is accurate and
complete.
Section 29 deals with the right of an applicant to request correction of
personal information:
29(1) An applicant who believes there is an error or omission in his or her
personal information may request the head of the public body that has the
information in its custody or under its control to correct the information.
The applicant argues that since the Board used the information
presented at the hearing for a decision that affected him, it must make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the information is accurate and complete:
"This `reasonable effort' extends to the provision of the audiotapes as
requested by me." He suggests by means of an example that he has reason to
think that some of the personal information in the control and custody of the
Board is incorrect and he wishes to exercise his rights to correct it. This
necessitates his access to the audiotapes "to aid my memory and as evidence in
support of my subsequent request to the Board to correct the information."
(Submission of the Applicant, p. 5)
The Board's response is that section 28 "was not - at least primarily -
intended by the Legislature to address quasi-judicial tribunal proceedings such
as those conducted by the Board in this case." (Reply Submission of the Board,
paragraph 10) Because I have concluded that the audiotapes are not properly
withheld by the Board under section 22 of the Act, I do not need to decide
whether section 28 and 29 apply. If it had been necessary for me to do so,
however, I agree with the Board that these sections cannot reasonably be
interpreted as applying to the applicant's request for review of the Board's
decision about access to the audiotapes.
Section 4(2): Information Rights and the requirements of
severing
The Board submits that the language of this subsection incorporates the
standard of reasonableness for severing for either technical or financial
reasons. It argues that a public body may be entitled to withhold an entire
record, "because it is not reasonably possible, technically, to sever excepted
information from the record and disclose the remainder without disclosing
protected information." (Submission of the Board, paragraphs, 21, 22)
Furthermore, it argues on the basis of affidavit evidence that the financial
and administrative burden on the Board of such severing is unreasonable, and
thus severance is not required. (Submission of the Board, paragraphs 23, 24;
see, especially, the affidavit of Joy Leach, paragraph 12) It also cannot
charge the applicant under section 75(3) of the Act for access to his own
personal information. (Submission of the Board, paragraph 31) The Board
concludes:
...judged from the perspective of financial reasonableness and practicability,
the personal information in question cannot reasonably be severed from the
record, and the Board should not be required to do so. (Submission of the
Board, paragraph 25)
In response to the Board's arguments, the applicant relies on Ontario
Order P-820. In that case, the Ontario Criminal Code Review Board had been asked to
provide an applicant with copies of tape recordings of Review Board proceedings
involving the applicant. The Review Board made arguments similar to those
advanced by the Board in the present inquiry. The Inquiry Officer for the
Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner treated the record as the personal
information of the applicant. The Inquiry Officer further concluded that the
Review Board had the technical capability to reproduce the tapes for
disclosure. The B.C. Board concludes, however, as follows about its tapes:
Because the tapes contain third party personal information that must be severed
from the tapes before they can be released, Order P-820 is not
persuasive on this point. It is one thing to ask a public body simply to
reproduce a tape in its entirety, without severance, and quite another to
require it to incur significant and unreasonable financial and practical costs
in severing tapes using the technology and process set out in the Board's
affidavits in this case. (Submission of the Board, paragraph. 29)
I have some sympathy for the position advanced by the Board because I am
interested in reaching pragmatic decisions under the Act. While financial,
practical, and technical considerations may be relevant to deciding whether
excepted information can reasonably be severed from a particular record, I must
be careful not to interpret section 4(2) of the Act in a manner which would
undermine the Act's stated purpose of promoting more open and accountable
public bodies. In the particular circumstances of this application, and having
regard to both the affidavit evidence and submissions before me, I am not
persuaded that, had it been necessary for the Board to do so, any third-party
personal information could not, for financial, practical, or technical reasons,
be "reasonably severed from" the tapes. I might conclude otherwise in some
extraordinary cases but this is not such a case.
Review of the Records in Dispute
It seems to me very important in the present case, and in an earlier
Order No. 204-1997, December 15, 1997, that the applicant was a full participant in
the oral hearing before the Board. I find it problematic to deny this
individual access to audiotapes of the very same proceedings, subject to the
various exceptions in the Act. The applicant submits that there "are no
reasonable expectations of harm to any parties nor financial interests by me or
any parties from disclosing the audiotapes." (Submission of the Applicant, p.
7)
The Board indicates that the tapes in dispute contain some personal
information of identifiable third parties, "including information as to their
employment histories, educational histories, employment experience,
qualifications and suitability for the public service position in issue."
(Affidavit of J. Leach, paragraph 19) The applicant's response is that the
tapes contain "very minimal, if any, third party personal information because
the central issue facing the Board on May 6, 1997 was more related to the
process/procedure of why I was not interviewed, not why I was not successful in
a competition. The significant difference is that the latter would require
substantial disclosure of third party information." (Reply Submission of the
Applicant, p. 3)
The applicant's recollection of the content of the tapes is correct. Most of
the information on the tapes concerns the processes and procedures related to
arranging an interview for the applicant and the creation of an eligibility
list for a related position. None of the other job candidates are identified.
There is some personal information regarding specific employees of the Ministry
and the Board but, in my opinion, this information concerns their jobs,
functions, or duties (section 22(4)(e)) not their employment, educational, or
occupational history (section 22(3)(d)).
I accept the Board's submission that severing the tapes in this case, if
severing indeed had to be done, requires somewhat specialized technical
expertise in order to sever and reproduce in compliance with the Act. (Reply
Submission of the Board, paragraph 6) But the burden would not have been, in
the circumstances of this case and having regard to the length of audiotapes,
unreasonably "complex and time-consuming," "costly and administratively
burdensome."
The Necessity for Taping
This Order and an associated one involving the University of Victoria raise
basic questions about the extent to which tape recording should occur at
various kinds of proceedings and for what specific purposes. For example, the
chair of the Public Service Appeal Board states:
Any requirement that the Board prepare and sever these appeal tapes, and create
a new record for the applicant, would almost certainly force the Board to cease
recording appeals. Appeal tapes are intended to be personal records of Board
members, to assist them if absolutely necessary [in] deliberating on, and
deciding, an appeal. It would be extremely unfortunate if these tapes no
longer were created. (Affidavit of Joy Leach, paragraph 14)
I have several comments. First, the Board should examine its rationale for
taping these proceedings. It should address such questions as how often the
tapes are in fact used (there have been 120 appeals heard within an unspecified
time period). Is there any actual need for them? In essence, the Board should
review its procedures on taping to ensure compliance with the Act and to meet
its operational needs.
8.
Order
I find that the Public Service Appeal Board is not required to refuse
access to the audiotapes requested by the applicant under sections 3(1)(b) and
22 of the Act. Under section 58(2)(a) of the Act, I require the Public Service
Appeal Board to disclose the records in dispute to the applicant.
December 18, 1997
David H. Flaherty
Commissioner