Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
Province of British Columbia
Order No. 165-1997
May 20, 1997
INQUIRY RE: A decision by the Ministry of Attorney General to deny access
to records relating to amendments to the Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984,
c. 22 pertaining to discriminatory publication
Fourth Floor
1675 Douglas Street
Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4
Telephone: 250-387-5629
Facsimile: 250-387-1696
Web Site: http://www.oipc.bc.ca
1. Description of the review
As Information and Privacy Commissioner, I conducted a written inquiry at the
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (the Office) on April 8,
1997 under section 56 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act (the Act). This inquiry arose out of a decision by the
Ministry of Attorney General (the Ministry) to withhold from an applicant
records revealing policy options and legislative objectives relating to
amendments to section 2 of the Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22.
The amendments were contained in Bill 33, which passed in June 1993 as the
Human Rights Amendment Act, 1993. The subject matter is the
prohibition of discriminatory publications that might incite hate propaganda
and activity; these are sometimes referred to as hate laws.
2. Documentation of the inquiry process
On July 23, 1996 the applicant submitted a request for records under
the Act to the Ministry. On October 15, 1996 it responded to the applicant's
request by releasing certain records and by severing and withholding other
records under sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Act.
On November 25, 1996 the applicant submitted a request for review of the
Ministry's decision to my Office. The grounds for review put forward by the
applicant were "that the public body improperly applied the provisions of ss.
12, 13, and 14 and failed to apply s. 25 of the Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act."
On March 6, 1997 the Ministry released a second package of records to the
applicant disclosing some of the information previously severed under
sections 12 and 13 of the Act.
3. Issues under review at the inquiry
The issues before me in this inquiry are whether the Ministry properly applied
sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Act, and whether it failed in a duty to apply
section 25 of the Act.
The relevant sections of the Act are the following:
Cabinet confidences
12(1) The head of a public body must refuse to disclose to an applicant
information that would reveal the substance of deliberations of the Executive
Council or any of its committees, including any advice, recommendations, policy
considerations or draft legislation or regulations submitted or prepared for
submission to the Executive Council or any of its committees.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to
Policy advice or recommendations
13(1) The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant
information that would reveal advice or recommendations developed by or for a
public body or a minister.
Legal advice
14 The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant information
that is subject to solicitor client privilege.
Information must be disclosed if in the public interest
25(1) Whether or not a request for access is made, the head of a public body
must, without delay, disclose to the public, to an affected group of people or
to an applicant, information
(b) the disclosure of which is, for any other reason, clearly in the public
interest.
(2) Subsection (1) applies despite any other provision of this Act.
Section 57 of the Act establishes the burden of proof on the parties in an
inquiry. Under section 57(1), where access to information in a record has been
refused, it is up to the public body, in this case the Ministry of Attorney
General, to prove that the applicant has no right of access to the records
withheld or severed under sections 12, 13, and 14.
Section 57 is silent with respect to a request for review on the failure of a
public body to apply section 25 of the Act to disclose records in the public
interest. As I noted in Order No. 162-1997, May 9, 1997, I am of the view that
the burden of proof is on the applicant with respect to the application of
section 25.
4. The records in dispute
The records in dispute consist of correspondence and memoranda between the
Ministry of Education, the B.C. Council of Human Rights, and the government's
lawyers in the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry of Attorney General. The
records date from 1992 and 1993.
5. The applicant's case
The applicant submits that he is entitled "to disclosure
of vital government information relating to the constitutionality of recent
legislation which infringes the free speech rights which are guaranteed by
section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 1) This should occur on the basis of
section 25 of the Act; alternatively, the applicant submits that the Ministry
has improperly relied on exceptions contained in sections 12, 13, and 14. I
have presented below the detailed arguments of the applicant on these
sections.
The applicant views Bill 33 as "the most significant legislative infringement
of press freedom in the recent history of British Columbia." (Submission of
the Applicant, paragraph 9) I have discussed below the applicant's views on
the constitutional implications of the records in dispute.
The applicant wishes me to order disclosure of the records in
dispute on the basis of section 25(1)(b) of the Act or on the basis of the
misapplication of sections 12, 13, and 14.
6. The Ministry's case
The Ministry states that most of the records in dispute are correspondence
among the Ministry of Education and Ministry Responsible for Human Rights and
Multiculturalism, the B.C. Council of Human Rights, and the government's
lawyers in the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry of Attorney General (which
now has responsibility for human rights and multiculturalism and thus has
custody and control of various relevant records). (Submission of the Ministry,
p. 4)
I have presented below the Ministry's submissions on specific sections of the
Act.
7. Discussion
The constitutional implications of Bill 33
One of the applicant's fundamental issues is the difference between section 2
of the Human Rights Act before and after the enactment of Bill 33:
Bill 33 removed the explicit statutory protection in the former statute for the
expression of opinion, expanded the scope of the prohibition against
discriminatory publications to include news stories and editorials in
newspapers, and added a new prohibition against exposing a person to hatred or
contempt. Bill 33 is much broader in scope and application than any other
counterpart provision in provincial or federal human rights legislation.
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 11)
In essence, the applicant submits that the infringement on freedom of
expression in Bill 33 reinforces the need for full disclosure of relevant
records to the public:
It is crucial, therefore, for the applicant to have full disclosure of the
legal advice received by the government in order to assess its scope in quality
and to determine whether the government received sufficient information about
other `human rights' instruments before passing Bill 33 into law. (Submission
of the Applicant, paragraph 14)
By severing the records released to the applicant to date, the applicant
asserts that the Ministry has deprived the public of appropriate knowledge of
various aspects of the lawmaking process. (Submission of the Applicant,
paragraphs 15, 16, 17)
The applicant has further explained the standards established by the Supreme
Court of Canada for a Charter challenge. He has also informed me that
the constitutionality of Bill 33 has been challenged by a B.C. newspaper, a
newspaper columnist, and the B.C. Press Council. (Submission of the Applicant,
paragraphs 18-38) While I fully agree with the applicant that it "is important
that all relevant government documents be subjected to full public scrutiny at
the earliest possible date," there is a judicial process underway which should
permit the appropriate documentation to be produced for a complaint proceeding
before the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal and before the courts of the land.
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 24; see also paragraph 38) While the
applicant has the right to ask for these records in dispute under the Act, he
may not have a right of access under the Act, whereas a right of access for
quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings may be more expansive. I agree with the
Ministry that the "present inquiry is not a Charter case; it is an inquiry
under the Act." (Reply Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 3.11; see also
paragraphs 3.12-3.14) I must act within my statutory mandate.
The applicant's reply submission raises many interesting questions about the
rationale and logic behind the enactment of Bill 33. (Reply Submission of the
Applicant, pp. 1-10) However, with the possible exception of section 25 of the
Act, there is no provision in it that authorizes me to overturn the Ministry's
proper application of sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Act on these grounds,
unless my review of the records in dispute (see below) reveals an inappropriate
reliance on them.
The applicant further states that he wishes to have access to these records
for purposes of preparing a detailed article concerning the origins, purpose,
and constitutional validity of Bill 33. (Submission of the Applicant,
paragraph 24) Again, his right of access, for whatever reasons, needs to be
tested against the exceptions in the Act.
The Ministry's alleged arbitrary and capricious exercise of its
discretion
The first half of the applicant's reply submission is largely taken up with
assertions that the Ministry acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in the
exercise of its discretion conferred by sections 13 and 14 of the Act, because
it did not offer detailed and convincing explanations for what it has done.
(Reply Submission of the Applicant, p. 1-6) I do not accept this line of
reasoning. The task of a public body under these particular sections is to
indicate which sections of which part of the Act it has applied to the records
in dispute; my role is then to determine whether the records fall properly
under that category of exception. In this connection, I do not require
"precise criticism and illumination by the Applicant" in order to carry out my
responsibilities. (Reply Submission of the Applicant, p. 7)
Section 12: Cabinet confidences
The Ministry states that it has applied this section to some of the
information in some of the records in dispute in order to protect the
confidences of the Cabinet and its committees, including comments made on draft
legislation and records submitted, or prepared for submission, to Cabinet.
(Submission of the Ministry, paragraphs 3.01-3.06)
On the basis of Order No. 8-1994, May 26, 1994, the applicant submits that
disclosure of the records in dispute would not reveal the "substance of
deliberations" of Cabinet or its committees. (Submission of the Applicant,
paragraph 41) It is also likely, he argues on the basis of Order No. 48-1995,
July 7, 1995, that the "information is in a record the purpose of which is to
present background explanations or analysis to the Executive Council or any of
its committees for its consideration in making a decision, and the decision has
been implemented within the meaning of section 12(ii)." (Submission of the
Applicant, paragraph 41) The Ministry's view is that sections 12(2)(a) through
(c) do not apply to exclude the application of section 12(1) in this case.
(Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 3.06)
Section 13: Policy advice, recommendations, or draft
regulations
The Ministry states that it has severed and withheld some information from
some of the records in dispute under this section, because it reveals advice or
recommendations to a public body, either explicitly or implicitly. (Submission
of the Ministry, paragraphs 2.01-2.05)
The applicant argues that the section 13 exception is not applicable because
the Ministry "failed to consider the important public interest in the
disclosure of the records having regard to the constitutional implications."
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 42) The applicant further submits that
the records in dispute fall under the categories of information listed in
sections 13(2)(b), (c), (g), (j), (k), (l), and (m). The Ministry states that
this is not the case. (Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 2.06)
Section 14: Solicitor-client privilege
The Ministry has relied on this section to withhold entire records and to
sever others on the basis of its understanding of the meaning of
solicitor-client privilege. (Submission of the Ministry, paragraphs 1.01-1.12.
) Two specific lawyers, who provided me with affidavits, functioned as legal
advisers for Bill 33, including comments on draft legislation.
The applicant submits that either the records in dispute are not subject to
solicitor-client privilege, or that it was waived. In addition, the applicant
alleges that the Ministry failed to consider the important constitutional
implications of the records. (Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 43)
Finally, the applicant claims that disclosure of these records of legal advice
would work to the distinct advantage of the public in perhaps remedying
deficiencies in explanations not previously offered in defense of Bill 33. My
view is that there is no provision in the Act that would require me to overturn
a public body's reliance on section 14 of the Act to protect legal advice,
because of the need to better inform public debate. (Reply Submission of the
Applicant, pp. 8, 9 and Appendix A)
Section 25: Disclosure in the public interest
The applicant, represented by counsel, has made an aggressive argument about
the relevance of section 25 in this inquiry. His view is that disclosure is
clearly in the public interest, that the Ministry has failed to comply with the
duty imposed by this section, and that I should order it to perform this duty.
(Submission of the Applicant, paragraphs 3, 4, 6; see also paragraphs 44,
48-54) Moreover, this application for review will test the efficacy of the Act
"as a mechanism for scrutinizing government initiatives which infringe
constitutional rights." (Submission of the Applicant, paragraph 16)
The applicant disagrees with my previous assertions that only a public body
can exercise section 25. He argues that sections 42(1)(b) and 42(2)(a)
authorize me "to determine whether the public body had complied with the
requirements of section 25(1)(b)." (Submission of the Applicant, paragraph
54)
The Ministry's view of section 25 is that it is "an exceptional provision"
applying only in the clearest and most serious of situations; "the public
interest in disclosure must be of an urgent and compelling nature before
section 25 will come into play." It anticipates that such a situation will be
"extremely rare." (Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 4.02)
The Public Body submits that disclosure of the information it has withheld
under sections 12, 13, and 14 is not clearly in the public interest. Further,
with respect to the information withheld under sections 12 and 14, the Public
Body submits that there is a clear public interest in not disclosing
that information. (Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 4.04; see also
paragraphs 4.05-4.07)
The Ministry also submits that I am not authorized to review its determination
that section 25 does not apply in the circumstances of this inquiry. With
respect, I disagree with this latter claim. Section 42(2)(a) of the Act gives
me the power to investigate whether a public body has performed a duty imposed
by the Act or the Regulation. Section 42(2)(a) states:
42(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commissioner may investigate and attempt to resolve complaints that
(a) a duty imposed by this Act or the regulations has not been performed,
....
In my opinion, section 25 creates a duty for public bodies to disclose
information in the public interest, if the information falls within the scope
of either or both sections 25(1)(a) or 25(1)(b). In its submission, the
Ministry agrees that section 25 imposes a duty on public bodies under the Act
(paragraph 4.02). I therefore find that I have jurisdiction to investigate a
public body's decision in relation to its duty under section 25. However, I
find below that section 25 does not apply to the records under review in this
inquiry.
It is not surprising to learn that the Ministry holds the view that disclosure
of the records in dispute is not clearly in the public interest and "there is
no urgency of circumstances to require disclosure under section 25." (Reply
Submission of the Ministry, paragraphs 3.01-3.07) A decision on that point
requires me to review the records in dispute, as I do below. However, I do
agree with the Ministry's position that there is no reason under this
section to disclose records in dispute so as to facilitate analysis of the
constitutionality of legislation by courts or to promote freedom of expression,
or to understand the complete role of the B.C. Human Rights Council in
connection with Bill 33. (Reply Submission of the Ministry, paragraphs
3.08-3.10)
I further agree with the Ministry's submission, in the context of this
inquiry, that the duty under section 25
only exists in the clearest and most serious of situations. A disclosure must
be, not just arguably in the public interest, but clearly (i.e.,
unmistakably) in the public interest. The duty to disclose must be performed
without delay, which also strongly indicates that the public interest in
disclosure must be of an urgent and compelling nature before section 25 will
come into play. (Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 4.02; italics in
original)
The Ministry's reply submission correctly notes the non-applicability of
section 25 to the records under review: "The Public Body submits that it has
not failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 25 of the Act because it
has no such duty in this situation. It has no such duty because disclosure of
the information is not clearly in the public interest within the meaning of
section 25." (Reply Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 3.02)
Review of the records in dispute
The Ministry emphasizes that it has withheld only a relatively small amount of
the total information requested by the applicant, including a very minimal
amount under sections 12 and 13. (Reply Submission of the Ministry, p. 16) It
also disclosed portions of legal opinions because they had previously been
disclosed to an applicant in 1994. The Ministry now believes that it was an
error to do so. (Reply Submission of the Ministry, paragraph 4.04)
I reviewed eight records that were withheld from the applicant under
sections 12 and 13 of the Act. The first record had in fact been released in full to
the applicant. For the remainder of these records, I find that the severances
were appropriately made under sections 12 and 13 of the Act. With respect to
this particular set of records, I find nothing that might have required the
Ministry to release information on the basis of section 25. The records
largely concern the process of interactive advice-giving that occurs in the
normal context of law reform. The Ministry has disclosed what it submits that
it can do lawfully under the Act.
I have reviewed all the records to which the Ministry has applied section 14.
In my opinion, all of these records fall within the scope of common-law
solicitor-client privilege, thus entitling the Ministry to withhold the
records.
The Ministry's initial submission notes that one of the records in dispute is
not a communication to or from a lawyer, but is a paper prepared by the
Director of Legislation of the Ministry of Education. The paper presents the
advice received from the Legal Services Branch of the Ministry of Attorney
General regarding amendment options. According to the Ministry, "as the
purpose of this paper was to set out the advice and to convey it to the
Minister of Education, the Public Body submits that this paper is subject to
the solicitor client privilege." (paragraph 1.09). Based on my review of the
record, I agree that the record contains information subject to
solicitor-client privilege, because it reflects advice received from the Legal
Services Branch of the Ministry.
8.
Order
I find that the Ministry of Attorney General has properly applied sections 12,
13, and 14 of the Act and is required or authorized to withhold the records in
dispute. In respect of records withheld under section 12, under
section 58(2)(c) of the Act, I require the head of the Ministry to refuse access to the
records. In respect of the records withheld under sections 13 and 14, under
section 58(2)(b) of the Act I confirm the decision of the head of the Ministry
to refuse access to the records.
I also find that the Ministry of Attorney General has acted properly in
refusing to apply section 25 of the Act pursuant to the applicant's request. I
make no order in this respect other than to note that the applicant has not
satisfied me that the application of section 25 to the records in issue is
warranted under the Act.
May 20, 1997
David H. Flaherty
Commissioner