Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
Province of British Columbia
Order No. 69-1995
December 13, 1995
INQUIRY RE: A decision by the District of Squamish to refuse access to the
addresses of electors contained in a List of Registered Electors
Fourth Floor
1675 Douglas Street
Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4
Telephone: 604-387-5620
Facsimile: 604-387-1696
Web Site: http://www.cafe.net/gvc/foi
1. Introduction
As Information and Privacy Commissioner, I conducted a written inquiry on
September 15, 1995 under section 56 of the Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). This inquiry arose out of the
applicant's request for review of the decision of the District of Squamish (the
District) to refuse access, under section 22(1) of the Act, to addresses of
individual electors contained in a List of Registered Electors.
2. Documentation of the inquiry process
The applicant submitted a request on May 18, 1995 for access to a "copy of
list of electors with addresses of electors as the statement by Clerk R. Miles
declares." The District wrote to the applicant on June 9, 1995 to acknowledge
receipt of the request and to refuse access to part of the records. It severed
the addresses of all electors listed in the records and provided access only to
the names listed therein. The applicant wrote to the Commissioner on June 16,
1995 for a review of the District's decision to refuse access to part of the
records.
3. Issue under review at the inquiry and the burden of proof
The District of Squamish acted in the first instance to refuse access under
the terms of section 63 of the Municipal Act. Thus the first question
before the inquiry is the relationship of the Municipal Act and the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
The second issue at stake in this inquiry is the application of section 22 of
the latter Act to the personal information contained in the District's list of
voters. Is the District required to deny the applicant access to the addresses
of registered electors in the District, because disclosure of this information
would be an unreasonable invasion of the third parties' personal privacy?
The relevant portions of section 22 are as follows:
22(1) The head of a public body must refuse to disclose personal information to
an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third
party's personal privacy.
(2) In determining under subsection (1) or (3) whether a disclosure of personal
information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal
privacy, the head of a public body must consider all the relevant
circumstances, including whether
(f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence,
(g) the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable, and
(h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of any person referred to
in the record requested by the applicant.
(3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable
invasion of a third party's personal privacy if
Under section 57(2) of the Act, the burden of proof is on the applicant to
prove that disclosure of the addresses of electors to him would not be an
unreasonable invasion of their personal privacy.
4. The records in dispute
The records consist of a computer-generated list of data arranged in six
columns: voter number; name (alphabetically by surname, followed by all given
names); street address; city; elector type (whether resident or property
owner); and a provincial voter ID number. The list provided to the applicant
contained only three columns: voter number; name of elector; and elector
type.
5. The applicant's case
The applicant wants the full list of electors for the District of Squamish.
He is not satisfied with the list minus addresses. In his view, section 22(1)
of the Act does not apply and portions of section 22(2) (discussed below)
favour disclosure. Moreover, he argues that the changes to the Municipal
Act concerning non-disclosure of addresses of electors are not well enough
known and need to be examined before the next municipal elections.
6. The District of Squamish's case
The applicant was a candidate in the District's municipal by-election on June
10, 1995. He received a copy of the list of electors for electoral uses under
Part 2 of the Municipal Act. The District removed the addresses of
electors "for privacy reasons," as authorized by section 63(10) of the latter
Act. The applicant then sought the full list of electors under the Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. The District refused this
request under section 22(1) of the Act.
I have discussed the basic elements of the District's case in appropriate
detail below.
7. Discussion
The Municipal Act, Part 2
Part 2 of the Municipal Act sets out "a comprehensive and exhaustive
legislative framework for the inspection, receipt and use of the list of
registered electors." (Submission of the District, p. 2) Section 36.1, which
was given royal assent on June 21, 1995, sets out a notwithstanding clause:
36.1. To the extent of any inconsistency or conflict with the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Parts 2 and 3 of this Act apply
despite that Act.
This notwithstanding clause only becomes operative if there is "any
inconsistency or conflict" between the two pieces of legislation. It is my
view that none exists in the present case and that both Acts apply.
Section 63 of the Municipal Act concerns the list of registered
electors. It must contain both the names and addresses of resident electors or
non-resident property electors. A person seeking to inspect the list "must
sign a statement that the person will not inspect the list or use the
information included in the list except for the purposes of this Part." A
person nominated as an election candidate has a right of access to the list
under similar controlled conditions (subsection 8). Furthermore,
63(10) The chief election officer may amend a list of registered electors that
is to be provided under subsection (8), or that is to be available for public
inspection, by omitting or obscuring the address of an elector or other
information about an elector in order to protect the privacy or security of the
elector.
(11) If requested by an elector, the chief election officer must amend a
list of registered electors as authorized by subsection (10) in relation to the
information regarding the elector.
Section 63(11), which is mandatory, is especially progressive from the point of
view of promoting informational self-determination by an individual.
Registered electors, especially vulnerable persons, deserve to be more fully
aware than they currently are of this particular provision of the Municipal
Act.
Although section 78(1) of the Act has now been repealed, it is clear to me
that the detailed requirements of the Municipal Act apply in the present
case (which is the basic position of the District), because they are much more
refined than the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
for electoral purposes. (Submission of the District, pp. 2, 3, 5) These
revisions to the Municipal Act incorporate a customized set of fair
information practices in a manner that I fully support. I find that they are
consistent with the provisions of the Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Act.
These electoral practices are applied by a local official, the chief election
officer. In the present inquiry, she amended the list of registered electors,
as authorized by section 63(10) of the Municipal Act, "by omitting the
addresses of all electors in order to protect the privacy and security of the
electors." (Affidavit of Trudy Coates, paragraphs 7, 8) Because the applicant
made a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, it was her determination that "because other means for objection to
registration of electors or verification of electors' registration were
available, disclosure of these addresses to the applicant would be an
unreasonable invasion of third parties' personal privacy." (Affidavit of Trudy
Coates, paragraph 11) I defer to her judgment on this matter.
Although the applicant claims that these new provisions in the Municipal
Act make it difficult for him to determine the residency of electors, "the
District submits that the inclusion of subsections (9), (10), and (11) in 1994
expressly recognized the third parties' right to privacy of personal
information, and that these goals must be paramount to the ability to make an
objection to the list of registered electors." (Submission of the District, p.
4)
The applicable provisions of the Act
Section 22(2)((a): The disclosure is desirable for the purpose of
subjecting the activities of the government of British Columbia or a public
body to public scrutiny
The applicant argues that he needs the addresses of electors in order to
subject the District of Squamish to public scrutiny, since an election is an
activity. I agree with the District that the Municipal Act provides
sufficient alternative statutory means and practices to achieve that goal.
(See Affidavit of Trudy Coates, paragraphs 8, 9)
Section 22(2)(c): The personal information is relevant to a fair
determination of the applicant's rights
The applicant believes that release of the disputed information is relevant to
a fair determination of his rights, since, as a candidate in a local election,
he wants to ensure that only eligible persons can vote. The District's
response, with which I concur, is that the procedures outlined in Part 2 of the
Municipal Act are sufficient to allow appropriate vindication of the
applicant's rights. (Submission of the District, p. 6; Affidavit of Trudy
Coates, paragraph 11) This can occur during a statutory viewing period for the
full records or, on election day, at the poll.
Section 22(2)(e): The third party will be exposed unfairly to financial
or other harm
The applicant states that no harm will come to third parties from the
requested disclosure. I find that the chief election officer of the District
exercised appropriate authority in making the determination that release of the
addresses would threaten the privacy and security of electors under the
Municipal Act and would be an unreasonable invasion of their privacy
under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.
Section 22(2)(f): The personal information has been supplied in
confidence
The applicant asserts that the personal information in question has not been
supplied in confidence, because the District can release the information under
the Municipal Act if it wishes to do so. While I agree that the
information has not been supplied in confidence in the traditional sense of
that term, disclosure of such information is now specifically governed by
sections 63(10) and 63(11) of the Municipal Act, and the District had
the authority to act as it did in the present matter.
Section 22(2)(g): The personal information is likely to be inaccurate or
unreliable
The applicant states that the address information in dispute is likely to be
accurate and reliable. While this statement is no doubt true, the decision on
further disclosure is now governed by the provisions of section 63 of the
Municipal Act.
Section 22(2)(h): The disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of
any person referred to in the record requested by the applicant
The applicant is of the view that disclosure of the information requested will
not damage the reputation of any person referred to in the records. This
particular argument seems to me to be irrelevant to the focus of the present
inquiry.
Section 22(1): The head of a public body must refuse to disclose
personal information to an applicant if the disclosure would be an unreasonable
invasion of a third party's personal privacy
The District's position is that disclosure of the personal information in
dispute in this inquiry would be an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy
for electors. (Submission of the District, p. 5) Given this view, the burden
of proof necessary to overcome this presumption rests on the applicant under
section 57(2) of the Act, which the District argues that he has not done.
I agree with the District's submission on section 22 of the Act, but I find
that it is not primarily determinative in this case, given the specificity and
prevailing force of sections 36.1 and 63.10 and 63.11 of the Municipal
Act. I choose to defer to the later and more precise instructions of the
Legislature on this matter in the revisions to the Municipal Act.
I uphold the decision of the District under both the Municipal Act and
the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act that disclosure
of the addresses of its electors to this particular applicant would be an
unreasonable invasion of their privacy.
8.
Order
I find that the provisions of the Municipal Act apply to authorize the
District of Squamish to refuse access to the records in dispute. I also find,
under section 22(1) of the Act, that it would be an unreasonable invasion of
personal privacy of third parties for the District to disclose the records in
dispute to the applicant, and that the District was required to refuse
access.
Under section 58(2)(b) of the Act, I confirm the decision of the District of
Squamish to refuse access under section 63 of the Municipal Act. Under
section 58(2)(c) of the Act, I require the District of Squamish to refuse
access to the records in dispute to the applicant under section 22.
December 13, 1995
David H. Flaherty
Commissioner